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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to explore the effects of interest rate ceilings in a small
open economy. In order to account for many individuals and lending, a model with
heterogenous agents is considered. The investigation is focused on two issues: first,
how effective are interest rate ceilings at reducing loans and risk in the economy and
at what cost; and second, whether imposing interest rate limits produce any different
response of the variables to aggregate shocks in the economy. The results obtained
from the model show that interest rate ceilings are effective at reducing high risk debt
in the financial system. The cost on consumption of reducing this risk is minimum in
the model. The findings for the second issue show that interest rate ceilings make debt
more responsive to shocks on the interest rates. In particular, the effect in percentage
points of an increase of interest rates could be twice as negative on debt under interest
rate ceilings.
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1 Introduction
Interest rates ceilings are a legacy of the first civilizations of humanity. The oldest known
reference dates from 2000-1400 B.C. in the Ancient India, and it has been present in many
other cultures until present days.1
In general, interest rate ceilings on loans can be defined as the maximum interest rate
that a financial institution can charge for lending.2 Implicit in this definition, there is a
regulator who establish a legal limit for the interest rate in the economy. The spirit of this
regulation has usually been related to the concept of usury.
Nowadays, there exist interest rates ceilings in some states of the U.S., Latin America,
Asia, Africa, and a large number of E.U. countries. In the U.S. interest rate ceilings would not
exist in practice, since financial intermediaries are able to export credit from non-regulated
states to other states where the regulation exist, see for instance Zinman (2003) [17]. For
most of the nations the debate about interest rate controls is open, and in a world where
the recent crisis came from financial frictions is important to have a deeper understanding
of the effects of financial regulations in a macroeconomic environment.
The literature of interest rate ceilings on loans began in the 1970’s with the irruption of
consumers credit. One stream of these literature justify the existence of lending rates controls
as a way to reduce adverse selection and the probability of default in a stable macroeconomic
environment, these ideas have been formulated in Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (1997)
[5], and Espinosa-Vega and Smith (2001) [4]. From a different perspective, but also in favor
of setting limits to the interest rates, Kurata and Tomoda (2007) [8] develop a model where
interest rate ceilings play a role as an export-promoting policy. On the other side, there are
those who argue that interest rates ceilings on loans would obstruct financial deepening and
create excess demand in the financial markets, see for instance Makinnon (1973) [10] and
Shaw (1973) [13].
Taking into account previous literature on the matter is important to answer whether
this regulation is effective at reducing risk from the financial system, and to explore to what
extent the excess demand created generates distortions in the economy. The approach used
to answer this questions is introducing interest rate controls in a macroeconomic environ-
ment with heterogenous agents who are subject to idiosyncratic shocks and interest rates
fluctuations. If the agents who face negative idiosyncratic shocks are those more indebted
and riskier for the financial system, it has to be analyzed how effective interest rate ceil-
ings are at reducing loans for these type of individuals. If any excess demand is created in
1Visser and McIntosh (1998) [16] give a short review of the history of interest rate ceilings.
2There also interest rate ceilings on deposits, which have been studied by Tobin (1970) [15], Smith (1984)
[14], and Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) [6].
2
the process, the cost for those agents from not receiving these loans has to be measured.
Other question addressed is whether interest rate ceilings produce any different response of
the variables to different shocks in the economy, in particular is interesting to contrast how
interest rate shocks affect debt in a model without interest rate ceilings and in a model with
the regulation.
The model is composed by: (i) a large number of individuals who maximize a standard
utility function on consumption subject to a budget constraint where savings or debt are
the mechanisms to smooth consumption in a incomplete asset market, where agents hold
just savings or debt for the idiosyncratic risk; this approach follows the debt elastic interest
rate closing of a small open economy model used by Schmidt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) [11]
with some modifications, (ii) an international financial institution or bank who sets interest
rates considering a risk premium for debt which is coincidentally implicit in the debt elastic
interest rate closing of the model, (iv) a regulator who establish the limits of interest rates.
The model is solved computationally using numerical solution methods with some of the
key features of the algorithm proposed by Aiyagari (1994) [1] where there is endogenous
heterogeneity coming from uninsured idiosyncratic risk faced by agents, also along the lines
of Krusell and Smith (1998) [7] there is a source of aggregate uncertainty coming from shocks
to the interest rate, and (iii) an informal lender who satisfy the excess demand for debt at
a higher rate premium.
In section 2 the small open economy model with heterogenous agents is explained in
detail as well the role played by the international financial institution, informal lender and
the regulator who establishes the interest rate ceilings. Section 3 explains the solution
method used to solve the model and the calibration for the economy. In section 4 the results
of the model are exposed and analyzed. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The first task to solve a small open economy model is to deal with the non stationarity
problem that comes from an international interest rate which does not necessarily coincide
with the subjective discount rate, this issue would cause a time dependent distribution for
consumption and not having a steady state in the model. The most standard way used to
solve this problem was assuming that the international interest rate equals the subjective
discount factor, however this approach limits the model from displaying any dynamic from
the steady state equilibrium and it would not be useful for the purpose of this paper where
we need fluctuations in the international interest rate in order to answer the question above
explained. For this reason, the stationarity problem is solved following the approach of a
3
debt elastic interest rate premium for closing small open economy models similar to those
proposed by Senhadji (1994) [12], Mendoza and Uribe (2000) [9] and Schmidt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2003) [11].
2.1 Agents
The economy is composed by a infinity-lived continuum of agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], all
of them with identical preferences. Each period t ∈ [0,∞), every agent has a source of funds
which comes from an exogenous income yi,t, which can either take a low y
low
i,t or a high y
high
i,t
value around a respective mean ym for these levels, and an endogenous debt di,t+1, which is
subject to the specific agent decision.3 This source of funds are used to pay debt services
[1 + rli,t]di,t, where r
l is an exogenous and fluctuating interest rate for the loans received
from a international financial institution, and also an endogenous consumption ci,t, which
is subject to the specific agent decision. Considering this budget constraint every agent
maximize their life time utility function E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ci,t), where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective
discount factor.
The key element to find a steady state solution for this maximization problem in this
small open economy comes from the interest rate faced by the agents. In order to obtain
a steady state solution for the model, following a similar approach used by Schmidt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2003) [11], we let the interest rate for loans be rli,t = r
∗
t + Φ(di,t), where r
∗
t is
an exogenous international interest shock, which can take a low r∗lowt or a high r
∗high
t value
around a respective mean r∗m for these levels, and the function Φ(di,t) is introduced in order
to close the model and takes the role of an agent-specific risk premium.4 Having all these
elements into account we can now write the maximization problem of the agents
Max
ci,t,di,t+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt u(ci,t) subject to, (1)
ci,t + [1 + r
∗
t + Φ(di,t)] di,t = yi,t + di,t+1 (2)
Where u(ci,t) satisfy the following conditions: u
′(ci,t) > 0, and u′′(ci,t) < 0. In order to
prevent agents from accumulating debt at a rate exceeding their respective interest rates the
3Although we characterize agents for convenience having debt they could also be saving, in which case
d takes a negative value. Therefore we can call savings s = −d.
4As we will se later this interest risk premium will give us an upward sloping supply curve for debt from
the international bank from a certain point, which is coincidentally what we need in order to leave open
the possibility of a potential excess demand when introducing interest rate ceilings. Think of a standard
supply and demand curve where in order to have an excess demand, from setting an interest rate below the
equilibrium, we need an upward sloping supply curve, which is in fact the effect of introducing Φ(di,t) in the
model.
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following transversality condition is imposed lim
t→∞
E0
di,t+1∏t
s=0[1+r
l
i,s]
≤ 0. The equations that
characterize the equilibrium process {ci,t, di,t}∞t=0 are given by:
Et ci,t+1 = β[1 + r
∗
t+1 + Φ(di,t+1) + Φ
′(di,t+1)di,t+1] ci,t (3)
ci,t + [1 + r
∗
t + Φ(di,t)] di,t = yi,t + di,t+1 (4)
Where r∗ = {r∗low, r∗high} and y = {ylow, yhigh} follow a Markov process given by the
transition probabilities matrixes Πr∗r∗′ and Πyy′ , respectively.
5 We define the current cardinal
utility function and the agent-specific cardinal risk premium function as follows:
u(ci,t) = log ci,t
Φ(di,t) =
 γ2
[
di,t
d∗
]2
di,t ≥ d∗
0 otherwise
Where, γ > 0 is a risk premium parameter, and d∗ is a level of debt from which indi-
viduals’ cost of credit include the risk premium. In order to find a value for d∗ we use the
first order condition given by equation (3) for some constant values of consumption and the
agent-specific cardinal risk premium function. Using for both equations di,t = d
∗ give us:6
d∗ =
1− β[1 + r∗m + γ2 ]
γβ
It is important to say that once shocks take action in the economy each agent will
choose a different path process {ci,t, di,t}∞t=0, therefore although individuals present identical
preferences they will ex-post behave in a heterogenous way. These different behavior of
agents will allow us to classify them according to their indebtedness and risk. In a general
classification we will let debtors be in a set D and savers in a set S. We can also classify
indebted agents for whom di,t ≥ d∗ in a set Dup and indebted agents for whom it doesn’t in
a set Ddown, where Dup ∪Ddown = D.
5The transition probability matrix Πr∗r∗′ give us the conditional probability for the next period r
∗′ given
what happen in the current period r∗, the same applies for Πyy′ .
6Notice that d∗ does not correspond to the steady state value of debt for the entire economy since we
are just taking in consideration one type of individual for whom Φ(di,t) = γ2 . We are just choosing a level
for d∗ from the steady state of the individual at the margin di,t = d∗ in the Φ(di,t) function. To find the
steady state value for dt of the whole small open economy we use numerical methods.
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2.2 International Financial Institution
The international bank is a financial institution who captures deposits from the public
and make loans in a competitive international financial market. We will assume for simplicity
that this financial institution has no reserve requirements. Following a similar approach used
by Edwards and Vegh (1997) [3] we can find a solution for the maximization problem of the
financial institution.
Every period the financial institution can trades bonds in the international financial
market at the interest rate r∗t . Since the bank can buy bonds in order to lend to the rest of
the world at the interest rate r∗t the spread earned from lending in our small open economy
is given by rlt − r∗t . Also, since the financial institution can always sell bonds in order to
borrow at the interest rate r∗t the spread earned by the bank from obtaining savings funds
of the small open economy is given by r∗t − rst , where rst is the interest rates received by the
agents from the small open economy for their savings. As an intermediary of funds the bank
incurs in a risk-related cost from lending which we will call Γ(li,t), where l is the amount
of lending. With all these elements taken into account the maximization problem of the
financial institution can be written as
Max
li,t,bi,t
∞∑
t=0
E0 δ
t
 ∫
i∈D
[rli,t − r∗t ]li,t di+
∫
i∈S
[r∗t − rst ]bi,t di−
∫
i∈D
Γ(di,t) di

Where δt is the real return factor for the bank, b is the amount of deposits, and s are
savings of individuals in the small open economy.7 As explained before r∗ = {r∗low, r∗high}
follows a Markov process given by the transition probabilities matrixes Πr∗r∗′ . The first order
conditions for li,t and bi,t for the bank’s maximization problem are given by:
rli,t = r
∗
t + Γ
′(li,t)
rst = r
∗
t
In a equilibrium without interest rate ceilings li,t = di,t and bi,t = si,t for all i.
8 Con-
solidating the agents and bank solution we have Γ′(li,t) = Φ(li,t), which means that interest
rate for loans consider the risk premium. Notice that since Φ(li,t) is a function of l, the first
order condition for loans give us the upward sloping supply curve for loans for agents in the
set Dup. On the other side, individuals in the sets S and Ddown face a flat interest rate, so
7Notice that
∫
i∈D
i di+
∫
i∈S
i di = 1.
8By defining l and d separately we leave open the possibility of excess demand when introducing interest
rate ceilings.
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they can obtain what they desire on savings or debt, respectively.
2.3 Regulator
The regulator of the small open economy establishes the interest rate ceilings. This
control of the interest rate give us the maximum interest rate that a financial institution
can charge for lending in the economy. We will assume that the algorithm used by the
regulator to set the interest rate ceilings considers previous period interest rates for those
who contracted debt services, and can be written as:9
IRCt =
∫
i∈D
rli,t−1 di
Where IRCt is the interest rate ceiling imposed by the regulator each period. Lets define
the set of individuals for whom the interest rate ceilings is binding as Dup−binding. Considering
the interest rate ceiling IRCt, the first order condition for lending, and introducing our
specific function Φ(li,t), we can estimate how much the bank is willing to lend with this
regulation to those in the set Dup−binding, by:10
li,t =
 dss
∣∣∣√ 2γ [IRCt − r∗t ]∣∣∣ IRCt > r∗t ∀i ∈ Dup−binding
li,t−1 IRCt ≤ r∗t ∀i ∈ Dup−binding
Notice that IRCt will be greater than r
∗
t most of the time given that IRCt is calculated
upon rlt, which at same time is greater than r
∗
t in equilibrium or after a positive shock on r
∗
t .
Since r∗t is a random variable which can rise at any time, and IRCt depends on the past value
of rlt, we assume that lending takes its previous value for shocks that makes IRCt ≤ r∗t .11
2.4 Informal Lender
Since li,t < di,t for individuals in the set Dup−binding, we introduce an informal lender who
charges an interest rate rili,t > ψr
l
i,t with ψ > 1 in order to satisfy part of the excess demand
created by the interest rate ceilings. We will assume that the amount of loans made by
9The algorithm used for the interest rate ceilings has the characteristic of being potentially binding for
some individuals and does not correspond to any particular country.
10For those in the set S and Ddown the regulation does not apply since they face a flat interest rate.
11We have to make this assumption in order to approximate the value of lending in our specification for
those who face a binding interest rate ceiling in the current period for a rise on r∗t . Given that after the
shock IRCt turns to be greater than r∗t again, the loss of information has a minimum impact in the model
and will not affect the results.
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the informal lender correspond to di,t − li,t, where di,t comes from the equilibrium without
interest rate ceilings. In what follows we will call debt to the loans obtain by the bank and
residual debt to the loans obtained by the informal lender.
3 Solution Method and Calibration
The second task to solve the small open economy model is to find a solution for the path
process {ci,t, di,t}∞t=0. Given the difficulty of finding an analytical solution in our dynamic
optimization problem, we use numerical methods to compute an approximation of the path
process of the variables. The approach used to solve the agents’ optimization problem is a
solution method along the lines of the algorithms proposed by Aiyagari (1994) [1] and Krusell
and Smith (1998) [7], where there exist endogenous heterogeneity coming from uninsured
idiosyncratic risk faced by the agents and a source of aggregate uncertainty coming from
shocks to the interest rate.
3.1 Solution Method
The dynamic optimization problem of the agents given by equations (1) and (2) can be
rewritten using dynamic programming under uncertainty. The Bellman equation associated
with the agents’ optimization problem can be written as
v(dt, yt, r
∗
t ) = Max
ct,dt+1
[
u(ct) + βEtv(dt+1, yt+1, r
∗
t+1|yt, r∗t )
]
with,
Etv(dt+1, yt+1, r
∗
t+1|yt, r∗t ) = Pv(dt, yt, r∗t )
Where v(dt, yt, r
∗
t ) is the optimal value function of the right hand side objective function,
and P is a joint transition matrix for {yt, r∗t } conditional probability Markov process and is
given by:12
P = Πr∗r∗′ ⊗ Πyy′
Associated with the optimal value function there is a decision rule dt+1 = f(dt, yt, r
∗
t )
that achieves the highest possible value for the objective function. The path process for ct
is obtained from the budget constraint, equation (2).
In order to solve computationally the decision rule for dt+1 we use the value function
iteration method. The decision rule obtained for some values of r∗t and yt is shown in figure
12The objective function is obtained from equations (1) and (2).
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dt+1
dt
dt+1
dt
Figure 1: Behavior of the decision rule for dt+1 for some combinations of r
∗
t and yt (negative
values indicate savings).
1 below.
What follows is to interpolate the data created in the decision rule and assign the random
shocks in the economy.13 We let the income shock to be specific for each individual and the
shock on the interest rate to be an aggregate shocks which affects the whole economy. Since
for every possible state of the economy there is an optimal response of the agents we are
able to obtain the path process for ci,t and di,t and the aggregate levels for this variables in
our small open economy.
3.2 Calibration
There are three parameters of the model that need to calibrated: β, γ and ψ. Additional
to these parameters we need to make some assumptions about the Markov process for the
idiosyncratic shock on income and the aggregate shock on interest rate.
Given that there is good available information about debt, income, and interest rates for
Chile, we will use this small open economy country as reference to calibrate the model.
According to Cox, Parrado and Ruiz-Tagle (2006) [2] the Chilean economy has a ratio
of banking debt to Gross Domestic Product of around 20% and annual interest rates on
consumer loans of around 15%. Our first approximation with this data is to establish the
mean value for the exogenous income ym in a level of 100, and the mean value for the
exogenous international interest rate in a level of 15%. Testing for different values of β we
13Random shocks generated come from a uniform distribution.
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obtain that the ratio of banking debt to income is around 20% in the model when β = 0.8.
The risk premium parameter γ for the bank is established in a level of 0.01 which means
that any deviation above d∗ is charge by 1%. Finally, by setting the parameter ψ in a level
of 2.6 we restrict the informal lender to charge any annual interest rate above 50%, which is
a rate non-banking lenders in Chile charge for loans on consumption.
The Markov generating process will be characterized by shocks around the mean values
of the international interest rate and income. The state values chosen for the interest rates
are r∗low = 0.7 r∗m, and r
∗high = 1.3 r∗m. For income the state values are y
low = 0.5 ym, and
yhigh = 1.5 ym. Finally, the conditional probability matrixes for the international interest
rate and income are given by
Πr∗r∗′ =
(
0.97 0.03
0.03 0.97
)
and,
Πyy′ =
(
0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9
)
Theses matrix give us the conditional probabilities of moving from one state to another.
In the case of Πr∗r∗′ with probability 0.97 the international interest rate will stay in the same
state and with probability 0.03 it will move to the other state. For income we will observe
less persistence given that Πyy′ makes more likely the probability to move from one state to
another. The reason of establishing these parameters for the conditional probabilities is to
make interest rate fluctuation not so volatile and income relatively more volatile.
4 Results
Imposing the interest rate ceiling in our model we find that on average aggregate debt
is reduced by 30.49%, interest rate is lower on average by 1.42 percentage points, and con-
sumption is reduced on average by 0.3%. In figure 2 we can observe the path process of
the aggregate variables (debt, interest rate and consumption) for the baseline model and the
model with interest rate ceilings.
As we can see observe from figure 2 the levels of debt and interest rates are reduced
significantly with the regulation across all periods. On its part, consumption shows a similar
path process for the baseline model and the model with interest rate ceilings. The intuition
behind these results is that every period the bank will reduce the amount of lending for
individuals for whom interest rates are binding and it will charge them with a lower interest
10
Figure 2: Path process for the aggregate levels of dt, r
l
t and ct.
Baseline Model Model with Interest Rate Ceilings
Figure 3: Impulse response effect of a 1 percentage point shock on r∗t over ln dt.
rate which is the interest rate ceiling, reducing this way individuals debt services. Since
individuals for whom interest rate ceiling is binding receive a lower level of debt than desired
they will end up going to the informal lender who will charge them with a higher interest
rate. This higher cost for residual debt is compensated by the lower debt services from
banks. Therefore the funds available for consumption remain at a similar level.
Using impulse response function we are able to analyze how a shock on interest rate affect
the variables of our baseline model and the model with interest rate ceilings. Given that
consumption follows a similar path process for both models we will focus on the response
of debt, see in the appendix the impulse response including consumption. In figure 3 we
observe the response of debt to a 1 percentage point change on the exogenous interest rate.
As you can observe in figure 3 the effect of a 1 percentage point change on the exogenous
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interest rate produce a current decline on debt of around 2% in the baseline model to then
continue falling to almost 4% in the third period. On the other hand, for the same impulse
response function in the model with interest rate ceilings a much deeper decline on debt in
the current period is produced of around 4% to then continue declining to around 6.3% in
the fourth period.
The intuition behind this amplified response of debt in the model with interest rate
ceilings is that since interest rate ceiling is defined as an average of all the interest rates for
indebted individuals, a rise on the interest rate will smoothly change the interest rate ceiling
while supply for loans by the bank is contracting considerably. Since for those individuals who
face binding interest rate ceilings debt is sharply declining the overall debt of the economy
will be lower too in our model with interest rate ceilings. In figure 4 we can analyze the
effect of an increase of interest rate for individuals for whom interest rate ceiling is binding.
As you can see in figure 4, an increase of exogenous international interest rate in the baseline
model for a particular type of individual will have a negative effect on debt moving from
point A to point B. On the other hand, in the model with interest rate ceilings a much larger
negative effect on debt happens moving from point A’ to point C’. To understand this notice
that at beginning of the period, under interest rate ceilings, the representative individual for
whom interest rate ceiling is binding is at point A’. In the next period the economy faces
an increase of exogenous interest rate. Given that interest rate ceiling is calculated on the
previous period interest rate, the interest rate ceiling will remain at the same level, but since
supply curve for loans shifts left in that period we will observe a new equilibrium at point
B. In the subsequent period the interest rate ceiling will adjust smoothly upward which will
cause the equilibrium for the individual to be at point C. Then, the effect of an increase of
the exogenous interest rate on debt will be much more negative under interest rate ceiling
than in the baseline model.
It is worth noticing that interest rate ceilings are effective at reducing vulnerability of the
agents in the economy. We can use as a measure of vulnerability
(1+rlt)dt
yt
, which is the ratio
of debt services over income. As we can see a lower income and greater debt service makes
individuals more vulnerable. The effect of interest rate ceilings over this variable in the
model with respect to the baseline model is a fall of vulnerability of 39.63%. The measure
of vulnerability can be consider a close indicator of the probability of default in the model
and the overall risk of the economy.
Summarizing interest rate ceilings produce a large decrease on lending in the model of
around 30.49%, the cost on consumption of this regulation is minimum given the reduction
on debt services for the bank. Also interest rate ceilings are highly effective at reducing
the overall risk of the economy. Finally, we find that interest rate ceilings make debt more
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Figure 4: Effect on debt of an increase of the exogenous interest rate r∗t for individuals who
face binding interest rate ceilings. In the baseline model we observe a movement from A to
B. In the model with interest rate ceilings we will observe a movement from A’ to C’.
sensitive to increases on the interest rates. In particular, the effect in percentage points of
an increase of interest rates could be twice as negative on debt under interest rate ceilings.
5 Conclusions
From a simple small open economy framework with heterogenous agents the most relevant
results on the effects of interest rate ceilings in the laboratory economy have been presented.
The findings coincide with those who argue that interest rate ceilings are an effective way to
reduce risk in the financial system. On its part, although is true that interest rate ceilings
produce excess demand for financial intermediation in the financial market there is no sign
that this regulation could have a negative effect on consumption. The effects on welfare of
a regulation of this type is beyond the scope of this model but it is important to mention
that it could be analyzed under the perspective of financial deepening and productivity. An
important finding of the model is that interest rate ceilings generate a distortionary effect
in the dynamic of the variables in the model, in particular debt is more responsive to shocks
on interest rates. The results obtained from the model indicate that under interest rate
ceilings the negative effect of an interest rate increase is two times larger than without this
regulation.
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Appendix
Impulse Response - Baseline Model
Impulse Response - Model with Interest Rate Ceilings
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